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Since Gavin and Perotti (2004) highlighted the strong pro-cyclicality
of fiscal policy in emerging markets, the international literature has
devoted an enormous amount of research to two main aspects: first,
continue documenting how pro-cyclical fiscal policy is, and second,
understanding why it is pro-cyclical.
It is fair to say that the consensus is that fiscal policy is pro-cyclical
in emerging and developing nations, but is far less in developed coun-
tries.
1 However, even a casual reader will find that the reasons behind
the pro-cyclicality of fiscal policy are not clear at all. The main problem
is the endogeneity of fiscal policy. The simplest framework to under-
stand this dilemma is the following:
y=ag+e
where y stands for output, and g stands for fiscal policy—either expen-
ditures or fiscal deficit. For expositional simplicity, this comment will
assume g are government expenditures.
2
The first equation is the typical fiscal multiplier. The idea is that
an increase in expenditure increases aggregate demand, and output.
Hence, in general, we expect the coefficient of that equation to be posi-
tive—as in the traditional Keynesian multiplier. The second equation
is the fiscal policy response. The classical theory predicts that if taxa-
tion or expenditures are distortionary, then government consumption
should smooth out output fluctuations. In that regard, booms should be
accompanied with government cuts, and conversely during recessions.
That means that the standard theory predicts a counter cyclical policy.
More precisely, the coefficient in the second equation should be nega-
tive if fiscal policy is used to smooth output fluctuations.300 Rigobon
In reality, both equations are at work; the first one implying a positive
correlation, the second one implying a negative correlation. Therefore,
what is the correlation measured in sample? The reduced form is
Which means that if the residuals are uncorrelated, that the correlation
between output and expenditures is?
aol+po] cc + pd
where 6 is the relative variance of the two shocks.
When we compare two countries there are three reasons why their
correlations can be different. First, a different correlation can be the
outcome of how fiscal policy responds to output shocks. It is possi-
ble that because of credit constraints, or other inefficiencies, govern-
ments in emerging markets cannot smooth government expenditures
as much as desired; and therefore, the coefficient f3 is too small, or even
positive, in comparison to the benchmark. This is one of the preferred
explanations in the literature, and the first one advanced by Gavin and
Perotti. By far, most of the discussion in the literature is about this coef-
ficient—although, I have rarely seen it estimated (with the exception of
one paper). I come back to this point below.
Second, similarly, it is possible that fiscal policy is just extremely
effective in smaller/emerging countries, and less effective in developed
nations. This will point out to the pro-cyclicality being the outcome of a
very strong Keynesian multiplier—i.e., the coefficient or is relatively big
in emerging markets.
Lastly, a country can have a higher correlation because it is hit by a
different combination of shocks. Under the assumption that a is posi-
tive and /?is negative, a decrease in 0 increases the correlation unambig-
uously. In other words, a country that is subject to a higher proportion
of supply shocks has a small—and possibly negative—correlation.Comment 301
My reading of the literature is that very few papers have disentan-
gled these possibilities properly. The best attempt is Gali and Perotti
(2004) where they use GDP of the trading partners as an instrument of
domestic output to estimate /?. Surprisingly, they find that it is nega-
tive—meaning that if there is a positive relationship between output
and expenditures it is because there is a positive feedback that drives
it.
The paper by Darvas, Rose, and Szapary (2005) offer a different
approach to the resolution of this dilemma, one that I find particularly
interesting, and convincing. The general idea of the paper is very sim-
ple, because countries embarked in a process of fiscal reform after sign-
ing the Maastricht Treaty, whose aim was to reduce the level and the
volatility of fiscal deficits in Europe; we can evaluate what occurs to
the correlation of GDP's across countries. Let's see how this question is
related to the previous discussion.
Assume that there are two countries described as follows:
yl=a1g1+e1
where we assume that the innovations to output are correlated, but the
fiscal policy shocks are not. This is one of the crucial assumptions that
the authors make, but one that I find reasonable. Outputs across Euro-
pean countries has very good reasons to be correlated—through trade,
productivity, migration, etc.—while fiscal policy decisions (the shocks
not the automatic response) are less likely to be correlated.
In this setup, output of each country is given by
which implies that the correlation between outputs is given by:
ala2cov(ele2)302 Rigobon
Notice that the assumption that countries are involved in a process




If that is the case, then the correlation between outputs increases. In the
limit, when the variance of the fiscal shocks becomes zero, outputs are
going to be correlated in the same way output innovations are.
This is exactly the hypothesis that this paper tests. They assume that
the Maastricht criteria includes a heavy dose of fiscal reform—which is a
sound assumption—and evaluate what are the implications of such pol-
icy on the comovement of output. They do not test their model using cor-
relations. They use the average absolute deviation, but the implications
are very similar. It is important to mention, that their results survive this
minor change in the definition. I believe that concentrating on the corre-
lation makes the intuition much simpler (as I did in my discussion), but
the authors have decided to highlight the absolute deviation, instead.
One interesting aspect is to draw the yearly average correlation
between all country pairs. This is done in Figure 1. As can be easily
seen, the correlation of output growth among all developed nations
increases substantially: from an average of 35 percent to an average of
45 percent. This is exactly what the authors would have expected if fis-
cal shocks are idiosyncratic and the fiscal reform makes them smaller.
--FD
Figure 1Comment 303
In addition to the GDP correlation, we can check this hypothesis by
observing the behavior of the fiscal accounts. Using the exact same




Again, if the variances of the fiscal shocks become smaller, then the
correlation between fiscal expenditures has to increase. In the limit, if
the variance of the fiscal shocks is zero, then the correlation between the
fiscal accounts is exactly the correlation of the output shocks. In Figure
1,1 also depicted the average correlation between fiscal deficits in the
region (the exact same pattern arises if we look at expenditures). Notice
the extremely large increase in the fiscal deficit co-movement—from 5
percent to almost 30 percent!
This very simple exercise shows—also confirms—the hypothesis
raised by the authors. In their paper, they make two important claims:
(1) that fiscal shocks are idiosyncratic; and (2) that the Maastricht cri-
teria reduced fiscal shocks. Because of these two assumptions, the
movement toward fiscal responsibility has made the countries better
candidates for a currency union.
In summary, this paper studies the implications of the move-
ment toward fiscal responsibility that took place in Europe after the
Maastricht Treaty, and its implications on output comovement
across the member nations. The claim is that if the fiscal shocks
are idiosyncratic, and if the fiscal effort implies a reduction in the
variance of those shocks, then the Maastricht criteria implies an
increase in the comovement of output across European countries,
making them better candidates for a currency union. They find
evidence that supports this view, and here I have presented further
evidence.
All their results depend on the two assumptions. The second one is
easily checked in the data. Fiscal deficits indeed came down, and their
volatility was reduced significantly. The second claim is much harder to
prove. In fact, it is the only critique I could see to the paper: fiscal shocks
are not necessarily idiosyncratic. However, if you have ever worked in
public office, as I did briefly, you will know this is not an assumption,
it is a description of reality.304 Rigobon
Notes
1. Kaminsky et al. (2005) also show that this pattern is also true for monetary policy.
2. If you would like to think about it as fiscal deficit, you are welcome to do the search
and replace.
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